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ACCOMMODATING FAMILIES: USING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT TO KEEP FAMILIES TOGETHER 
SUSAN STEFAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Years ago, when children were born with severe disabilities, especially 
mental disabilities, they were likely to be institutionalized at birth or shortly 
thereafter.1  When women with serious psychiatric disabilities who were 
clients of the mental health or social service systems became pregnant, their 
children were often taken away from them at birth and put up for adoption.2  
For years, the social reality was that when one member of the family was 
born with or developed a serious mental disability, the family did not stay 
intact.3 
Beginning in the 1970s, the dominant paradigm in disability policy 
toward children and adults with mental disabilities began to change.4  The 
 
* Center for Public Representation, Newton, Massachusetts.  Much of the social science 
research in this article was prepared by Sarah Weston, whose assistance and support was 
invaluable: this article would not have been possible without her.  I gratefully acknowledge the 
groundbreaking work of Joanne Nicholson, Andrea Blanch, and the late Carol Mowbray.  
This article is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Gabrielle Stefan. 
 1. See SARAH GEHLERT & TERI ARTHUR BROWNE, HANDBOOK OF HEALTH SOCIAL WORK 450 
(2006); see generally EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA’S WELFARE STATE: FROM ROOSEVELT TO 
REAGAN (1991); see also U.S. Office of Special Education Programs, History: Twenty-Five 
Years of Progress Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, available at 
www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (discussing 
hundreds of thousands of children with disabilities living in institutions in the 1960s). 
 2. Walter E. Barton, Foreword to ROBERTA J. APFEL & MARYELLEN H. HANDEL, MADNESS AND 
LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD: SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG-TERM MENTAL ILLNESS, xv, xv, 
(1993); Roberta G. Sands, The Parenting Experience of Low-Income Single Women with 
Serious Mental Disorders, 76 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. HUMAN SERVICES 86, 86 (1995). 
 3. See Barton, supra note 2; see also Sands, supra note 2. 
 4. See VALERIE J. BRADLEY & JAMES KNOLL, SHIFTING PARADIGMS IN SERVICES TO PEOPLE WITH 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 3-5 (1990); David Mechanic & David A. Rochefort, 
Deinstitutionalization: An Appraisal of Reform, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 301, 301-04 (1990) 
(discussing the history of deinstitutionalization and its effects); see generally Gerald N. Grob, 
The Forging of Mental Health Policy in America: World War II to New Frontier, 42 J. HIST. 
MED. & ALLIED SCI. 410 (1987) (discussing the historical shift in the treatment of individuals 
with disabilities). 
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new framework went by different names in different fields, but its 
overarching ideal was community integration and maintaining family 
integrity.  In education, children who had previously been expelled from 
school for severe behavior problems were given services to keep them in 
school if possible, a process known as “mainstreaming;”5 in residential 
settings the goal was “deinstitutionalization;”6 in social services, it was called 
“family preservation” or “family stabilization.”7  Even when a child was taken 
out of a family, the goal was generally reunification with the family.8 
Family integrity and family stabilization efforts focused principally 
(although not entirely) on situations where the disabled member was the 
child, not the parent.9  There has been a consensus for several decades in 
public policy, the research literature, and advocacy efforts regarding the 
benefits of keeping families intact when a child has a serious mental 
disability, and the importance of providing the necessary services and 
supports to parents, grandparents, and extended family members to ensure 
that the child can remain with his or her family.10  More recently, advocacy 
and public policy initiatives have attempted to ensure that parents will not be 
required to forfeit custody of their mentally disabled children in order to 
receive needed mental health services available only to children in state 
custody.11  In the last several years, lawsuits have compelled states and cities 
 
 5. Conor B. McDonough, The Mainstreaming Requirement of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act in the Context of Autistic Spectrum Disorders, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1225, 1226 (2008); Leslie Reed, Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free?  How the 
Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 251, 266 (2008). 
 6. See Mechanic & Rochefort, supra note 4, at 303-04 (discussing the reasons for the 
rise of deinstitutionalization); see also Lisa.L. Leitzell & David T. Somppi, Perspectives on 
Group Homes, 4 J. Planning Literature 357, 372 (1989) (discussing the reasoning for 
deinstitutionalization); THOMAS P. SMITH & MARTIN JAFFE, SITTING GROUP HOMES FOR 
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS, ch. 2, available at: www.mncdd.org/parallels2/pdf/86-
SGM-APS.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (discussing literature promoting 
deinstitutionalization). 
 7. Julie Odegard, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Creating “Family Values” 
for Physically Disabled Parents, 11 LAW & INEQ. 533, 558 (1993). 
 8. See generally Lisette Austin, Giving the Family a Chance: Working Towards 
Reunification, THE CONNECTION, Fall 2008, at 10, 10 (promoting family reunification efforts); 
see also Odegard, supra note 7, at 558 (stating that “[b]ecause an essential goal of social 
services is family preservation, the state has a duty to investigate services such as reunification 
which will achieve that goal.”). 
 9. See, e.g., National Family Preservation Network, About NFPN, at www.nfpn.org/ 
about-nfpn.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2009) (explaining that the purpose of the National 
Family Preservation Network is to “improve[] the well-being of children”). 
 10. Austin, supra note 8, at 10. 
 11. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Response to 
Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2005); see generally 
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to provide wraparound services for seriously emotionally disturbed children 
in their homes under the Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment 
(EPSDT) portion of Medicaid.12 
Far more modest progress has been made with programs to help 
parents (usually mothers) with mental disabilities keep their children.  One of 
the first such programs was the Thresholds Program in Chicago,13 and today 
a small number of model programs exist across the country.14  Because of 
funding and agency structures, however, family unification programs 
targeted at families where one member has a disability are generally aimed 
at helping the family in order to benefit a specific individual client, either the 
child or the parent.15  It is rare for the entire family to be identified as the 
client of a program. 
During the same period of time in which wraparound and other models 
of family-based care have developed to keep families intact, advocates have 
used the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)16 to promote community 
integration of adults with mental disabilities.17  In 1999, the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Olmstead v. L.C., that unnecessary institutionalization 
constituted segregation under the ADA,18 sparked a national effort to 
maximize community placement and integration of adults with psychiatric 
disabilities.  Since then, a number of court cases have been brought aimed 
 
Gwen Goodman, Accessing Mental Health Care for Children: Relinquishing Custody to Save 
the Child, 67 ALBANY L. REV. 301 (2003); Tracy J. Simmons, Relinquishing Custody in 
Exchange for Mental Healthcare Services: Undermining the Adoption and Safe Families Act’s 
Promise of Reasonable Efforts Towards Family Preservation and Unification, 10 J. L. & FAM. 
STUD. 377 (2008); Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Custody 
Relinquishment to Obtain Mental Health Services for Children, at  www.bazelon.org/issues/ 
children/custody/index.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). 
 12. See Rosie D. v. Romney, 401 F. Supp. 2d 18, 52 (D. Mass. 2006); Katie A. v. Bontá, 
433 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1074-75 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 13. Thresholds Psychiatric Rehabilitation Ctrs., The Thresholds Mothers’ Project: 
Overview, at www.thresholds.org/mothers.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). 
 14. These programs are described in various places, including APFEL & HANDEL, supra, 
including ROBERTA J. APFEL & MARYELLEN H. HANDEL, MADNESS AND LOSS OF MOTHERHOOD: 
SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND LONG TERM MENTAL ILLNESS 163 (1993) and “Parental Mental 
Illness” on the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services website, at http://dcfsweb 
resource.prairienet.org/ras/mental.php (last visited Feb. 29, 2009).  Because of the exigencies 
of funding, some of these programs may no longer exist.  The principles on which they 
operate, however, remain constant: that both children and parents are better off if the family 
remains together, with services that maximize their strengths and supports to assist them. 
 15. See Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Critical Issues for Parents with Mental Illness and Their Families, at www.mental 
health.samhsa.gov/publications/allpubs/KEN-01-0109/ch7.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 17. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999). 
 18. Id. at 599-601. 
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at enforcing the finding in Olmstead that individuals should not have to give 
up integrated life in a community setting in order to receive necessary 
treatment for their disabilities.19 
Despite obvious parallels between family integration and community 
integration, efforts to use the ADA to keep families intact in the community 
when one member of the family has a psychiatric disability have failed 
almost completely.20  These cases have generally been brought on behalf of 
an individual disabled parent in state court, claiming that a state social 
services agency had an obligation to provide accommodations to the 
disabled parent prior to terminating parental rights.21  Despite the fact that a 
substantial number of families who are subject to termination proceedings 
have at least one member with a psychiatric disability, both federal and state 
courts have recoiled from suggestions that the ADA requires state agencies 
to truly modify their practices, services, or training in recognition of this fact, 
or to provide more than cursory accommodations (or, in some cases, any 
accommodations at all) to keep families intact when one member has a 
psychiatric disability.22  Some state courts have held that violations of the 
 
 19. See Frederick L. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 364 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated, 
422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Pa. Protection and Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Public 
Welfare, 402 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2005); Arc of Washington v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Messier v. Southbury Training School, 562 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
 20. Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental Illnesses in 
the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 273, 275 (2003); Alexis C. 
Collentine, Note, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call for Change in State 
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535, 562 (2005); Sherry S. 
Zimmerman, Annotation, Parents’ Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as Ground for 
Termination of Parental Rights—Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act, 119 A.L.R. 351 
(2004); Joanne Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood in Adults with Mental Illness: 
Implications for State and Federal Policymakers, Programs, and Providers, in MENTAL HEALTH, 
UNITED STATES, 2002, at 133 (Ronald W. Manderscheid & Marilyn J. Henderson eds., U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Pub., 2004) [hereinafter Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of 
Parenthood]. 
 21. See, e.g., J.H. v. Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 30 P.3d 79, 86 (Alaska 2001); 
Collins v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA02-653, 2003 Ark. App. LEXIS 52, at *1 (Ark. App. Jan. 
22, 2003); Greenfield v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA02-525, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 600, at *1 
(Ark. App. Oct. 30, 2002); Parker v. Dep't of Human Servs., CA96-155, 1997 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 53 at *1 (Ark. App. Feb. 5, 1997); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1115 
(App. Ct. 2000). 
 22. Some courts have held that no services were required because a parent’s mental 
illness would preclude her from being able to parent, or that the ADA does not apply to 
termination proceedings, and therefore no accommodations are required.  See In re B.S., 693 
A.2d 716, 720 (Vt. 1997); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. App. 1999).  Other 
courts have held that the ADA does not affect or increase the duty imposed by statute to 
provide reunification services, so that parents with disabilities are not entitled to any more or 
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ADA cannot be used as a defense to termination of parental rights and have 
instructed parents to bring their claims in federal courts.23  Some federal 
courts have held that they cannot resolve ADA claims, either because they 
do not have the jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear 
appeals of final state decisions regarding parental rights, or because they 
invoke the Younger abstention doctrine.24  Other courts have held that 
parents who asked for accommodations once termination proceedings were 
underway asked too late;25 still others have held that parents did receive 
accommodations and were simply unable to benefit from them.26 
The central argument of this article is that attempts to apply the ADA to 
keep families together when one member has a psychiatric disability have 
used the wrong strategy, at the wrong time, and have employed the wrong 
argument.  Individual claims on behalf of a disabled parent at the time of 
termination proceedings asking for reasonable accommodations have failed 
in scores of cases across the country in different jurisdictions and before 
different judges. 
Instead of case-by-case adjudication, disability advocates should bring 
systemic ADA discrimination cases seeking to expose and confront the 
exclusion and discrimination inherent in the operation of the interlocking 
mental health, social service, and legal systems.  Those frameworks, 
presumptions, and structures essentially erase the possibility of keeping the 
family together, affirmatively undermine family integrity, and create barriers, 
burdens, and obstacles to people with psychiatric disabilities remaining with 
their families.  Thus, by the time of the individual termination proceedings, 
the termination outcome is often predetermined.27 
 
different services from parents who are not disabled.  Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th 
Cir. 2000; In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. Wis. 1994). 
 23. In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Anthony P., 84 Cal. 
App. 4th 1112, 1116 (App. Ct. 2000); Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Child and Fam. 
Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1995); In re B.K.F., 704 So.2d 314, 317 (La. App. 1994); 
In re B.S. 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997). 
 24. Miller v. Nichols, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 1533, at *9-*12, *16 (D.Me. Jan. 9, 2009); 
Hilger v. Mink, No. CV 01-1132-AS, 2002 WL 31441221, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2002); see 
also Burgess v. Carmichael, No. 99-17540, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11102, at **3 n.1 (9th 
Cir. June 7, 2002). 
 25. In re C.M., 526 N.W. 2d 562, 566 (Iowa App. 1994). 
 26. Bartell v. Lohiser, 12 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (E.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, 215 F.3d 550 
(6th Cir. 2000); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995); In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d at 
566. 
 27. It is true that some parents abandon their children or prefer to see them 
institutionalized.  See Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1184 n.15 (S.D. Ohio 1993) 
(involving a father who stated that his disabled son should remain in a nursing home the 
father did not see or correspond with him for over twenty years).  Some older children who 
have lived with their natural families express a desire to be taken from their family and 
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The attitudes and assumptions of social service agencies and the legal 
system mirror in many ways the attitudes and assumptions applied to the 
parenting capacities of people with physical disabilities.  Until relatively 
recently, judges and social service agencies simply did not believe that 
people who were, for example, blind, deaf, or wheelchair bound could 
adequately parent a child.28  These social service agencies and family court 
judges believed that certain physical disabilities completely precluded 
successful parenting, and the same is true today for psychiatrically disabled 
parents.  Asking for reasonable accommodations, which requires the agency 
and court to believe that the barriers to successful parenting can be 
alleviated by rearranging certain aspects of service delivery, flies in the face 
of the underlying assumption that the disability itself fundamentally precludes 
parenting at all. 
In addition, it is worthwhile to explore the application of the Olmstead 
integration holding to efforts to keep families together when one member 
has a disability.  This article argues that family integration is not only a 
natural corollary to community integration, it is a fundamental component 
of community integration.  Community integration (people with disabilities 
living in the community) is a meaningless concept without family integration 
(people with disabilities living in intact families).  Furthermore, to the extent 
that family integration and community integration are separate concepts, 
this article argues that the language and logic of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Olmstead should apply to family integration as much as it 
applies to community integration, and for many of the same reasons. 
Section II of this article will set out research findings reflecting that the 
psychiatric disability of one member of a family affects all members of the 
family, that the solution to the problems that families face when one 
member has a psychiatric disability is to assist the family rather than (literally) 
dismember it, and that the best way to provide this assistance is to the family 
as a whole.  Section III will review the history of federal anti-discrimination 
law, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,29 and its applications to 
family integrity.  I will focus on several early cases whose significant 
implications have been lost over the years: the far-sighted district court 
 
adopted.  See J.T. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 947 S.W. 2d 761, 764 (Ark. 1997).  This article 
is not about those families.  It is about families with a disabled member who want to stay 
together when the state seeks termination because of its judgment that the disability of one 
member means that the family as a unit should be dissolved, as opposed to assisted with its 
deficits and accommodated with its imperfections. 
 28. Michael Ashley Stein, Mommy Has a Blue Wheelchair: Recognizing the Parental Rights 
of Individuals with Disabilities, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1069, 1069-70 (1994); Odegard, supra 
note 7, at 534. 
 29. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973). 
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decisions in Homeward Bound v. Hissom30 and Joyner v. Dumpson.31  
Section III will also examine the integration mandate and ignore Olmstead 
v. L.C., and argue that the language and logic of each of these cases 
supports the proposition that efforts to keep families with a disabled member 
together are required by current anti-discrimination law.  Section IV of this 
article will discuss why efforts to use the ADA to maintain family integrity 
have, for the most part, failed.  I contend that lawyers have concentrated 
too much on individual cases claiming discrimination on the basis of 
disability, and not enough on the failures of state human service systems to 
overcome structural prejudices against people with psychiatric disabilities as 
parents. 
Finally, Section V will discuss potential models for ADA cases on behalf 
of families with a psychiatrically disabled family member.  I argue that 
pursuing community integration without maintaining family integrity is, in 
some ways, a meaningless concept that perpetuates discriminatory images 
of people with psychiatric disabilities as disconnected from intimate 
relationships and incapable of successful parenting, who can never be seen 
as truly a part of the community. 
II.  THE INTERFAMILY AND INTERGENERATIONAL IMPACT OF MENTAL DISABILITY 
The majority of people who suffer from mental illness over their lifetimes 
are parents.32  Over one million parents of children under eighteen have a 
serious psychiatric disorder.33  In fact, people with serious mental illness 
“may be at least as likely, if not more likely” to have children than people 
without serious mental illness.34 
Most parents with mental illness escape the attention of child welfare 
authorities; however, “those that do are likely to face other serious 
challenges as well: poverty, single parenthood, few family or other social 
supports, and domestic violence or childhood sexual abuse.”35  Intervention 
from state social service agencies and dissolution of the family is often the 
 
 30. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 
27104 (N.D. Okla. July, 24, 1987). 
 31. Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 712 F.2d 770 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (citing misapprehension of the scope of Section 504; this misapprehension was 
corrected by the U.S. Supreme Court less than five years later in Alexander v. Choate, 469 
U.S. 287 (1985)). 
 32. Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood, supra note 20, at 120, 128; 
Kathleen Biebel et al., The Responsiveness of State Mental Health Authorities to Parents with 
Mental Illness, 32 ADMIN. & POL’Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 31, 31-32 (2004). 
 33. Glennon, supra note 20, at 273. 
 34. Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of Parenthood, supra note 20, at 123. 
 35. Glennon, supra note 20, at 273. 
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final blow to parents already struggling under the accumulating impact of 
stressful and disempowered lives with few choices and fewer opportunities.36 
There are at least six to nine million children in the United States with 
serious emotional disturbances.37  These children are the focus of poorly 
coordinated interventions by multiple human service systems—social 
services, mental health services, early intervention educational services, and 
foster care services—as well as the juvenile correctional system, including 
juvenile justice and court diversion, among other services.38 
Both personal memoirs and research literature show that when one 
member of a family has a serious psychiatric disability—whether the parent 
or child—it affects the entire family.  Disability theorists emphasize that 
disability is less a trait or characteristic manifested by one person than the 
product of interaction among individuals, or between an individual and 
society.39  The more that individuals interact, the more that the nature and 
impact of the disability are mediated by that interaction; thus, this dynamic 
and interactive theory of disability may be most true in the context of a 
family.40  Even when only one member of a family has a psychiatric 
disability, its consequences may have enormous and crucial impact on other 
members of the family.  Other family members themselves may need 
assistance, both to accommodate the family member with a disability and to 
help them through the frustration, exhaustion, or confusion that often 
accompanies having a family member with a mental disability. 
 
 36. In re Juvenile 2006-833, 937 A.2d 297, 300-02 (N.H. 2007) (holding that a 
mother’s parental rights could be terminated when she failed to take psychotropic medications 
she could not afford, and that the state’s social service agency had no obligation to provide 
her with the medications or help her pay for them); In re J.R., CP99010717A, 2003 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 3665, at *5-*6,* 9, *11,* 47 (Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that a mother’s 
parental rights could be terminated where she had a psychiatric disability, a co-occurring 
substance abuse problem, and difficulty finding and maintaining housing). 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON 
GENERAL 1999, at 179 (1999), available at http://download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/ 
surgeongeneralreport/C3.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). 
 38. Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1314-15. 
 39. MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 5, 22 (1996). 
 40. It is regularly reported that people with disabilities, even seriously impairing 
disabilities, are successful if they are treated by their parents as “normal” children.  See, e.g., 
ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, ONE OF US: CONJOINED TWINS AND THE FUTURE OF NORMAL (2004); 
JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
(1994).  Children adapt to having a disabled parent quite naturally if the disability is 
presented as an ordinary part of the individual’s life.  See JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING 
VIOLATIONS: WAR ZONES, WHEELCHAIRS, AND DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE (1995).  But see, 
e.g., ALLEN SHAWN, WISH I COULD BE THERE: NOTES FROM A PHOBIC LIFE 93–115 (2007) 
(attributing life-long and severely impairing phobias to his parents’ deeply negative attitudes 
toward his developmentally disabled sister, who was sent away at an early age). 
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The discussion above assumes that only one member of the family has a 
disability, but, like the American household headed by a working father and 
stay-at-home mother, the family with one seriously emotionally disabled 
family member may be more of a cultural narrative than a reality.41  
Increasingly, psychiatric disability is recognized as both interfamilial and 
intergenerational.42  Statistics reflect that roughly forty percent of children 
with serious emotional disturbance in the mental health system have had a 
parent who was psychiatrically hospitalized at least once.43  Approximately 
fifty-five percent of children with serious emotional disturbance in the mental 
health system have a family history of serious psychiatric disability.44  
Between one third and one half of children of mothers with serious mental 
illness will themselves have a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders diagnosable disorder.45  In one survey of mothers with mental 
illness, mothers reported that one-third of their adult children had not 
completed high school, and about one-third experienced psychological 
problems.46  “[I]t [also] might be inferred that the adult children in this study 
had relationship problems, in that, at an average age of 22, only about one 
in nine were in a committed relationship, although 38 percent were 
parents.”47  In fact, children whose parents have serious mental health 
problems are generally accepted by federal and state programs as being “at 
risk.”48 
 
 41. Both research and case law reflect the prevalence of families where both parents and 
children have disabilities, or where multiple siblings have disabilities.  See J.B. v. Valdez, 186 
F.3d 1280, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 1999).  Although this article concentrates on psychiatric 
disability, the number of poor families where parents and children have both physical and 
psychiatric disabilities is strikingly high.  See Nat’l Council on Disability, TANF and Disability: 
Importance of Supports for Families with Disabilities in Welfare Reform 5-6 (2003), available 
at www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/familysupports.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2009) [hereinafter Nat’l Council in Disability, TANF]. 
 42. Nat’l Council in Disability, TANF, supra note 41. 
 43. CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 
PROGRAM: EVALUATION FINDINGS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2002-2003, at 15 fig.4 
(2003). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Carol Mowbray et al., Parenting of Mothers with a Serious Mental Illness: Differential 
Effects of Diagnosis, Clinical History, and Other Mental Health Variables, 26 SOC. WORK RES. 
225, 225 (2002) (internal cites omitted); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., 2000). 
 46. Carol T. Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes for Adult Children of Parents with 
Severe Mental Illnesses: Demographic and Clinical History Predictors, 21 HEALTH & SOC. 
WORK 99, 105 (2006) [hereinafter Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-4.3(g) (2005) (listing New 
York’s Early Intervention Program risk factors, which include “diagnosed serious and persistent 
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The fact that mental health problems tend to be intergenerational is well 
established in the literature.49  A survey of nearly 6,000 respondents from 
across the United States that evaluated respondents’ mental health in a 
structured diagnostic interview, then collected information on the mental 
health status of respondents’ natural parents, found significant familial 
aggregation for all conditions surveyed: major depression, generalized 
anxiety disorder, antisocial personality disorder, alcohol abuse/dependence, 
and drug abuse/dependence.50  This finding is consistent with a broad array 
of studies that have demonstrated convincingly that parents with depression 
and anxiety are more likely than the general population to have children 
with mental health problems.51  Parental mental health problems have been 
associated with an increased risk of both internalizing (e.g. depression) and 
externalizing (e.g. Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder) emotional 
difficulties in offspring.52  Although different study designs and populations 
produce different probabilities, studies have generally shown that children 
 
mental illness”);  Maternal and Child Health Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Abstracts Details: State Grants for Perinatal Depression–Fiscal Year 2006, The Massachusetts 
Maternal and Infant Mental Health Project, at https://perfdata.hrsa.gov/mchb/DGISReports/ 
Abstract/AbstractDetails.aspx?Source=TVIS&GrantNo=P12MC07724&FY=2006 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2009).  Details about Minnesota’s programs to assist at risk children whose mothers 
have psychiatric difficulties can be found online at Minnesota Dep’t of Health, Minnesota Title 
V MCH Needs Assessment Facy Sheets, Promotion of Maternal & Infant Mental Health 
Summer 2004, at www.health.state.mn.us/divs/cfh//na/factsheets/pwmi/maternalmenth 
lth.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see also Mowbray et al., Psychosocial Outcomes, supra 
note 46, at 225. 
 49. Kenneth S. Kendler et al., The Familial Aggregation of Common Psychiatric and 
Substance Use Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey: A Family History Study, 170 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 541 passim (1997); Roselind Lieb et al., Parental Major Depression and the Risk 
of Depression and Other Mental Disorders in Offspring, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 365, 
365 (2002); William R. Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring of 
Parents with Affective Disorder in a Non-Referred Sample, 15 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 313, 320 
(1988) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring]; Catherine 
A. Lesesne et al., Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in School-Aged Children: Association 
with Maternal Mental Health and Use of Health Care Resources, 111 PEDIATRICS (Supplement) 
1232, 1234 (2003); Shelli Avenevoli & Kathleen Ries Merikangas, Implications of High-Risk 
Family Studies for Prevention of Depression, 31 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. (Supplement 1) S126 
passim (2006). 
 50. Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 541-43, 545. 
 51. Lieb et al., supra note 49, at 365 (stating that “[s]tudies…have consistently shown that 
offspring of depressed parents have a substantially increased risk for experiencing not only 
depressive disorders, but also other psychopathology, such as anxiety or substance-use 
disorders.”); Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring, supra note 49, at 
320. 
 52. See, e.g., Lesesne et al., supra note 49, at 1233-34 (noting that maternal depression 
and anxiety and/or emotional problems are associated with a more than four-fold increased 
incidence of ADHD in their offspring); Lieb et al., supra note 49, at 365. 
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with a parent suffering from major depression has an odds ratio of 
somewhere between 2.21 to 1 and 3.6 to 1 of suffering from some form of 
emotional disorder themselves, compared to controls with healthy parents.53  
One study of children enrolled in an HMO found that thirty percent of the 
children whose parents suffered from major affective disorder suffered from 
depression themselves, compared to just two percent of the children whose 
parents did not suffer from major affective disorder.54  Other studies put this 
figure even higher.55  Furthermore, research has revealed that parental 
depression not only increases the odds that children will have depression, 
but is also “associated with an earlier onset and a more malignant course 
(severity, impairment, recurrence) of depressive disorders in offspring.”56 
In fact, studies have shown that psychiatric disabilities are often a multi-
generational phenomenon that extends beyond the individual family.  In one 
three-generational study, researchers found that nearly half of children with 
both a parent and a grandparent with major depressive disorder suffered 
from some form of psychopathology, and that those grandchildren with both 
a parent and grandparent who suffered from major depression were the 
most impaired.57  Another study, which followed an original group of 
participants, their children, and eventually their grandchildren for nearly 
twenty years, revealed that nearly sixty percent of the grandchildren who had 
both a parent and a grandparent with major depression suffered from 
psychopathology, and when it was measured, the mean age of the 
grandchildren was just twelve years old.58 
The fact that the impact of psychiatric disability is multi-generational, 
however, should not lead to a “three generations of melancholics is 
enough” approach.59  Not only research, but personal memoirs and 
accounts, reflect the truth that the best and most enduring accommodation 
 
 53. Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 545 (collecting studies); Lieb et al., supra note 49, at 
369 tbl.2. 
 54. Beardslee et al., Psychiatric Disorder in Adolescent Offspring, supra note 49, at 320. 
 55. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S127 (reviewing the literature and citing a 
study showing that the cumulative risk of major depression in children with depressed parents 
was nearly 70%). 
 56. Lieb et al. supra note 49, at 365. 
 57. Virginia Warner et al., Grandparents, Parents, and Grandchildren at High Risk for 
Depression: A Three-Generation Study, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 289, 
293 (1999). 
 58. Myrna M. Weissman et al., Families at High and Low Risk for Depression: A 3-
Generation Study, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 29, 29-30, 34 (2005). 
 59. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said, in upholding the sterilization of an 
allegedly mentally retarded woman, that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”  Buck 
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
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for people with even the most serious disabilities is the love and tenacity of 
their family, however imperfectly expressed.60 
When a family member has a psychiatric disability, the family may well 
need support and services of varying intensity over time.  It is not always or 
even generally the case that dissolving or dismembering the family will 
improve the situation of all or any of the family members.  Often the most 
powerful incentive a parent, especially a mother, can have to seek treatment 
or stay in recovery is to keep her child and be a good parent for that child.61  
At the same time, involuntary separation from parents, even imperfect 
parents, can be one of the most traumatic events of a child’s life.62  Yet the 
structure and framework of state health, mental health, and protective 
service agencies which fail to identify and recognize the centrality of family 
members’ attachment to each other, as well as their efforts and 
accommodations, often do result in family dissolution.  Dissolution itself can 
lead to institutionalization for one or more members of the family in years 
and sometimes generations to come. 
While there is significant evidence demonstrating the intergenerational 
impact of a psychiatric disability, the mechanism is less clear.  One reason 
may be that “[b]ecause of the stigma attached to mental illness, parents may 
not ever share the fact that they have a mental illness with their children.  
This means that even years later, adult children may not have an 
explanation for parental behavior.”63  One of the most successful and 
simplest programs for families in which one member has a psychiatric 
disability is an educational program for the entire family explaining about 
mental illness and what family members can expect, which is discussed in 
greater detail infra.64 
Another explanation is that families in which one member has a severe 
mental illness are also often characterized by stressful environments, 
 
 60. See generally ANDREW BRIDGE, HOPE’S BOY (2008); KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN 
UNQUIET MIND (1995); TRACY THOMPSON, THE BEAST: A JOURNEY THROUGH DEPRESSION (1995); 
JEANNE SAFER, THE NORMAL ONE: LIFE WITH A DIFFICULT OR DAMAGED SIBLING (2002); see also 
supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Carol T. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness: 
Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Postpartum Period, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 21, 21 (1995); 
APFEL & HANDEL, supra note 14, at 4-5, 160-61. 
 62. See BRIDGE, supra note 60. 
 63. Jared Wadley, Adult Children of Mothers with Mental Illness Show Problems, UNIV. OF 
MICH. NEWS SERVICE, June 1, 2006, at www.ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=276 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (quoting “Daphna Oyserman, a professor of social work and 
psychology, and a research professor in the Institute for Social Research . . . .”). 
 64. William R. Beardslee et al., A Family-Based Approach to the Prevention of Depressive 
Symptoms in Children at Risk: Evidence of Parental and Child Change, 112 PEDIATRICS e119, 
e122, e127 (2003), at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/112/2/e119 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach]. 
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including uncertain housing, health care, and income for groceries, which 
also lead to marital discord and depression.65  Some research indicates that 
stressful environments increase the likelihood that the children of depressed 
parents will develop depression.66  Because of this, programs like Thresholds 
in Chicago which assist the family to obtain stable housing and employment 
often show beneficial results in terms of family stability.67 
Genetics explains only a small piece of the familial aggregation 
phenomenon.68  No specific “depression gene” has been identified.69  
Family-environmental factors are thought to be a major driver of family 
clustering of mental health problems, although findings are not always 
conclusive.70  Specifically, studies have focused on the fact that parental 
mental illness can lead to poor parenting, which in turn is associated with 
increased mental health problems in children.71  For example, studies have 
shown that maternal depression can lead mothers to “exhibit inadequate 
parenting skills (e.g., less interaction, ineffective control strategies) and 
model dysregulated affect (e.g., restricted affect, more hostility, irritability, 
and sadness)”, all of which are associated with the development of mental 
health and/or behavioral problems in offspring.72  Similar mental health 
and/or behavioral problems in offspring emerge in family environments 
characterized by high levels of “family and marital discord, divorce, 
inattention, rejection, abuse and stress”.73 
Given that children with a family history of mental health problems are 
at a high risk of depression or other psychiatric disorders, and the apparent 
importance of family-environmental factors, many researchers and clinicians 
have theorized that interventions targeting the family environment are the 
 
 65. See Nat’l Council on Disability, TANF, supra note 41, at 22 (a heartbreaking review 
by the National Council on Disability of families where both parents and children had 
disabilities and the parents were forced to work under TANF). 
 66. See Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S128; Mark T. Greenberg et al., The 
Prevention of Mental Disorders in School-Aged Children: Current State of the Field, 4 
PREVENTION & TREATMENT, Mar. 30, 2001, at 27-28. 
 67. Thresholds Psychiatric Rehabilitation Ctrs., The Thresholds Mothers’ Project: 
Overview, at www.thresholds.org/mothers.asp (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). 
 68. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S127, S128. 
 69. Id. at S128. 
 70. See id. at S128, S132 (explaining that “impaired family environments and social 
relationships of individuals with depression contribute to the risk for depression among family 
members”); see Kendler et al., supra note 49, at 546 (finding that “only a modest proportion 
of overall familial aggregation of all disorders, except for [antisocial personality disorder][,]” 
could be explained by family environmental factors). 
 71. Avenevoli & Merikangas, supra note 49, at S128. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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most useful in mitigating risks to children.74  Research has shown that family-
based interventions can be effective in preventing the onset of 
psychopathology in children of parents with mental illness.75 
Beardslee et al. designed and tested a family-based intervention that 
aimed to increase resilience in adolescents who were at high risk for 
psychiatric disorders due specifically to having parents with mental 
illnesses.76  The intervention was mostly educational, and focused on giving 
both affected parents and their children more information about their 
disease.77  The information included details about the disease itself, how 
and why it should be discussed with their children, how parental mood 
disorders affect children and what warning signs to look for, how to help 
their children develop relationships and behaviors associated with increased 
resiliency, and how to reduce familial-environmental conditions associated 
with increased psychopathology in children of parents with mood 
disorders.78  The information was delivered in one of two ways.  Part of the 
study group received the information in two separate lectures, with no 
children present.79  The other part of the study group participated in six to 
eleven one-on-one meetings with a care provider, with some of these 
meetings involving the children and some only involving the child, and with 
follow-up phone calls and/or meetings at six to nine month intervals.80  
Follow-up interviews with parents and children showed that the children had 
a better understanding of their parents’ disease, and also showed fewer 
internalizing symptoms, which are considered a precursor to more serious 
affective disorders.81  These positive effects were still present when measured 
four and a half years after the relatively brief intervention.82 
In a review of interventions designed to prevent childhood mental illness 
for children at risk for a variety of reasons not limited to family history of 
psychiatric disorders, Greenberg et al. found thirty-four interventions that 
had successfully reduced symptoms or direct precursors of childhood mental 
 
 74. Id. at S132 (concluding that “findings support family-based programs . . . .  
Additionally, the large environmental component of depression suggests that alterations in the 
environments of those at risk for depression (by virtue of a family history) can lower risk for 
depression.”). 
 75. See William R. Beardslee et al., Long-Term Effects from a Randomized Trial of Two 
Public Health Preventive Interventions for Parental Depression, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 703, 704, 
710 (2007) [hereinafter Beardslee et al., Long Term Effects] . 
 76. Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach, supra note 64, at e120. 
 77. Id. at e122. 
 78. Id. at e122. 
 79. Id. at e123. 
 80. Id. at e122. 
 81. Beardslee et al., A Family Based Approach, supra note 64, at e127-28. 
 82. Bearslee et al., Long Term Effects, supra note 75. 
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illness, had been rigorously evaluated and published in a peer-reviewed 
journal, and had targeted children between the ages of five and eighteen.83  
The reviewers concluded that interventions targeting children alone were less 
effective in reducing psychiatric symptomology than programs that targeted 
children, parents and schools together.84  Greenberg et al. also noted that 
more interventions had been designed that focused on preventing 
externalizing (i.e. aggression) as opposed to internalizing (i.e. depression) 
behavior.85 
Of course, the impact of the disability goes beyond the family.  The 
family is both affected by the person’s disability and by the social response 
to the disability.  It can mediate and interpret the social response to the 
disabled family member by reinforcing it, by discounting it, and by giving the 
disabled family member acceptance, hope, and support, or by some 
complex mixture of these elements which may vary over time and individual 
family members.  The family’s actions and reactions to disability—support, 
helplessness, rejection, and abuse, for example—in turn ameliorate or 
exacerbate the effects of the disability for the individual, and affect how the 
individual approaches the world—another reason that family supports and 
services are a key first step to community integration.86  A family’s positive 
and supportive attitudes and behaviors toward its disabled family member 
signals to neighbors, school officials, and the community how they should 
react to the individual with a disability.  By the same token, family 
disparagement, frustration, and negativity may also carry over into the 
attitudes of providers and community members. 
III.  THE ADA AND KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER 
A. The Integration Mandate 
When Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, it 
contained a single line prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap 
in programs receiving federal funding.87  Because programs were federally 
funded by different agencies across the Executive Branch, from the 
Department of Transportation to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development,88 each federal agency had to develop its own regulations to 
 
 83. Beardslee et al., supra note 66, at 7-8. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
 85. Id. at 34. 
 86. Susan Stefan, “Discredited” and “Discreditable”: The Search for Political Identity by 
People with Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2003). 
 87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973). 
 88. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.190 (1991) for description of agencies charged with enforcing 
the regulations. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
150 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:135 
implement Section 504 in the particular programs it funded.89  Since it was 
obvious that many definitions and other aspects of the regulations would be 
identical across the agencies, a “lead agency” was designated to issue so-
called “coordination regulations” which applied to all agencies and which 
had special authority.90  The then-Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) was designated the “lead agency.”91  HEW delayed issuing 
these coordination regulations, but finally, after significant pressure 
(including a federal lawsuit,92 disability activists taking over the San 
Francisco office of HEW, and picketing the home of Secretary Califano93), it 
reluctantly issued regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.94 
One of these “coordination” regulations which applied across the board 
to all recipients of federal funds, regardless of their program, was a 
provision that was the forerunner of a regulation that came to be known as 
the “integration mandate.”95  In the coordination regulations, HHS defined 
discrimination as a failure to provide equally effective aids, benefits, and 
services to handicapped individuals as nonhandicapped person.96  The 
regulation added that 
[f]or purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be equally 
effective, are not required to produce the identical result or level of 
achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, but must 
afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to 
gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement, in the 
most integrated setting appropriate to the person’s needs.97 
Later, the “lead agency” function was shifted to the Department of 
Justice, which adapted and updated HEW’s regulations.98  The Department 
of Justice regulations defined discrimination as failure to provide services in 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 65-66. 
 92. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 923 (D.D.C. 1976). 
 93. RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL 
DISABILITY POLICY 112, 115 (2nd ed. 2001); SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 66.  See both SCOTCH 
and SHAPIRO for accounts of the history behind the battle to obtain regulations for Section 
504. 
 94. These regulations are titled “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs 
or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” and are found at 45 C.F.R. § 84 (2008). 
 95. Nat’l Disability Rights Network, Issue Areas-Community Integration: ADA Title II, at 
www.napas.org/issues/commint/title2.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) 
(2008); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2008). 
 96. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (2008). 
 97. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 98. SCOTCH, supra note 93, at 129-30. 
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the most integrated setting appropriate to the individual’s needs.99  The 
commentary to the Section 504 regulations also added a definition of an 
integrated setting for the first time.  It provided that an integrated setting is 
“a setting that enables disabled individuals to interact with non-disabled 
persons to the fullest extent possible”.100 
The first case to recognize that an institutional setting might constitute 
segregation in violation of antidiscrimination law was decided years before 
the passage of the ADA, and more than a decade before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C..101  Homeward Bound v. Hissom,102 
more than any case in the intervening twenty-plus years, serves as a model 
of understanding of the relationship between a person with mental 
disabilities remaining with his or her family and that person’s successful 
integration in the community.  Homeward Bound is a tutorial on the 
necessary connection between family stabilization and community 
integration.  The court in Homeward Bound created principles and remedies 
that remain as alive and true today as they were when it was written over 
twenty years ago. 
B. Cases Ahead of Their Time: Homeward Bound v. Hissom and Joyner v. 
Dumpson 
1. Homeward Bound v. Hissom 
In 1987, three years before the passage of the ADA and twelve years 
before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. L.C., a Republican-
appointed judge in Oklahoma considered a challenge by institutionalized 
individuals with mental disabilities and their families to the conditions of the 
institution in which these disabled people were forced to live, and the State’s 
failure to provide services in the community.103  The judge ruled for the 
plaintiffs, holding that “Section 504 recognizes the parallels between 
discrimination suffered by our handicapped citizens and other minority 
groups.  This discrimination is manifested through their segregation from the 
rest of society. . . .  Section 504 prohibits unnecessarily segregated services 
for retarded persons.”104 
 
 99. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2008). 
 100. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 App. A (2008). 
 101. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 102. See Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No.85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104 
(N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987); Timothy M. Cook, Howard Bound Court Strikes Blow to State-
Supported Segregated Services for Disabled Persons, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 
358, 358 (1987). 
 103. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *8-*14. 
 104. Id. at *20. 
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The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to services that were 
effective and meaningful and delivered in non-segregated settings.  He 
further held that the institution must be closed, and ordered the State of 
Oklahoma to develop a new community service system to remedy the effects 
of its original discriminatory system.105  In developing its remedy, the court 
explained the centrality of the family to the goal of community integration, 
and tailored the remedial plans accordingly.106  The remedy in Homeward 
Bound focused heavily on family integration and family support.107 
At the beginning of the Court Plan, Judge Ellison wrote the following 
words, worth reproducing at length: 
As Americans and citizens of Oklahoma, we believe in rugged 
individualism, the sanctity of the family and in taking care of our own.  We 
grow from the experience of living together in the community.  We admire 
those who work and we work hard so that our children can have the best life 
and education possible.  We have sacrificed to maintain our freedom and a 
life which is nonrestrictive.  These values are our heritage which we preserve 
so that it can be passed down to our children—all of our children. 
The qualify of life made available in the United States as a result of this 
value base is the best in the world for those who are allowed to share in it.  
The “American Dream” rests at the foundation of the values we defend. 
From the evidence presented it is apparent that these values have been 
denied to that portion of the citizens of Oklahoma who carry the label of 
“mental retardation”. Therefore, this Order shall include “Guiding 
Principles” which are intended to direct the remedy developed by the parties 
as they create community alternatives for persons with mental retardation in 
Oklahoma.  These guiding principles are as follows: 
* All persons are capable of growth and development. 
* All persons deserve to be treated with dignity. 
* All persons have value. 
* All persons must be involved in and carry the primary responsibility for 
the decisions which affect their lives. 
* All persons should live and work in the most natural settings. 
* All children should live with families. 
* All children have the right to a free and appropriate education. 
 
 105. Id. at *21, *30-*31. 
 106. Id. at *23. 
 107. Id at *27. 
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* All persons should live in and be a part of the community. 
* All citizens have the right to fully exercise their rights as guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States.108 
The language and the remedy in Homeward Bound emphasized that 
family services, accommodating families, and community integration for 
individuals with mental disabilities were unitary and inseparable parts of the 
remedy.109  The court observed that 
[h]istorically the public policy of Oklahoma has been that persons with 
mental retardation will only receive support in living environments if the 
individual leaves home and moves to a state operated institution.  The State 
has provided little or no resource to assist a person to stay at home, but has 
consistently provided immense financial resource to house people away 
from their own homes.  The result has been that families have become 
frustrated with their inability to respond to the family member’s needs. . . .  
Families have experienced severe pain at having to separate their child from 
home and family.110 
The court ordered that “[a] gatekeeping mechanism must be 
implemented to insure that persons will not be removed from their natural 
home except in extreme circumstances[,]” and that “[a]ll necessary supports 
and services must be provided to the home so that it can be the living 
environment most likely to provide for individual growth and 
development.”111  The court further ruled that “[i]n home and family support 
services shall not cost the family any more than would be the cost of raising 
a child without mental retardation[,]” that “[r]espite, including emergency, 
occasional and regular respite, as well as in home workers shall be 
available, as needed, to maintain a balanced, nurturing and supportive 
home environment . . . “  Further, the court required that “[p]arent/family 
training will be provided on any issue pertinent to positively maintaining the 
child at home”.112  But the court also astutely recognized that family support 
services must be voluntary and tailored to each individual family’s needs: 
“[i]ntrusion into normal home life shall be minimized and no more support 
or service shall be provided than is required.”113  In addition, the court 
ordered the provision of transportation to allow involvement in community 
life and case management to insure access to and coordination of supports 
and services, including participation in education services.114  Finally, the 
 
 108. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *22-*23. 
 109. Id. at *23. 
 110. Id. at *27. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Homeward Bound, 1987 WL 27104 at *27. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at *28. 
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court directed the State of Oklahoma to ensure that “licensure, policies and 
procedures of the programs, supports and services which currently exist or 
those which will be developed” did not have conflicts with or hamper the 
remedy, and that abundant protective mechanisms be built into the system, 
including self advocacy training, incident reports and reviews, and 
independent case management.115 
The Homeward Bound remedy is a detailed blueprint for a community-
based system which emphasizes family integrity.  Thus, disability advocates’ 
current failure to ensure that Olmstead integration claims include family 
integrity and preservation is hard to understand.  If the Homeward Bound 
framework were adopted by social service agencies today as part of the 
structure of services provided to families of people with mental and 
psychiatric disabilities, it is likely that those families would be far more likely 
stay intact and integrated in the community. 
2. Joyner v. Dumpson 
Even before Homeward Bound, disability advocates challenged New 
York State’s requirement that parents had to give up custody of their 
children to the Department of Social Services in order for the children to 
receive residential services for serious emotional needs.116  The parents 
challenged this requirement, claiming that it violated the Constitution and 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.117  In language that foreshadowed the 
decision in Olmstead v. L.C. more than fifteen years in the future, plaintiffs 
argued that this requirement discriminated against them because 
among all those eligible to receive any of the various forms of partially 
federally funded state assistance, only plaintiffs [were] required to submit to 
state custody as a prerequisite of receipt of needed benefits.  Plaintiffs also 
[asserted] that within the class of handicapped persons, plaintiffs 
comprise[d] a disadvantaged sub-class that alone [was] subject to the 
custody transfer requirement prior to the receipt of special services.  Plaintiffs 
argue[d] that the pre-condition imposed only on them as a result of their 
need for treatment in residential facilities [limited] their access to needed 
benefits and [discouraged] their use of needed benefits in direct violation of 
§ 504 and 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a) (1980).118 
The District Court, noting that defendant could not proffer any 
reasonable explanation for why parents would have to give up custody of 
their children to receive services, and underscoring that this rule applied 
only to children with mental disabilities, granted summary judgment both on 
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 116. Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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 118. Id. at 238. 
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the Section 504 claims and on the accompanying constitutional claims.119  
The Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that Section 504 did not apply 
to disparate impact claims,120 a premise with which the Supreme Court 
disagreed only a few years later in Alexander v. Choate.121  The Second 
Circuit did find, however, that plaintiffs had stated a viable constitutional 
claim and remanded the case to the District Court.122 
Years after Joyner, parents still have to surrender custody of their 
children across the country to obtain the mental health services that their 
children need.  This is clearly discriminatory under Olmstead, and very likely 
a constitutional violation as well, and will be discussed more fully in 
Section V. 
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act proved disappointing to advocates 
and people with disabilities, both in its scope and the interpretations of the 
courts.123  Prior to passing the ADA, Congress gathered an unprecedented 
amount of testimony regarding discrimination against people with 
disabilities, including at least some testimony by people with physical 
disabilities who were not permitted to adopt children.124 
As a result of this testimony Congress had a much broader view of the 
nature and impact of disability discrimination in America, and by the time 
the ADA was passed, the language of integration was clearly at the heart of 
the ADA’s mandate.125  In reports pertaining to the ADA, both houses of 
Congress concluded that 
there is a compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities and for the integration of persons with disabilities into the 
economic and social mainstream of American life.  Further, there is a need 
 
 119. Id. at 239, 242. 
 120. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 121. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 122. Joyner, 712 F.2d at 772. 
 123. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the 
shortcomings of Section 504). 
 124. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 5-20 (1989) (testimony regarding the need for 
legislation prohibiting disability discrimination); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43-47 
(1990) (testimony regarding the effects of disability discrimination on society).  This 
discrimination has by no means ended.  See generally Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (child removed from prospective adoptive parents’ home when it was discovered 
that mother was HIV-positive); Doe v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 
462 (D.N.J. 2001) (infant removed from mother at the hospital when hospital reported to 
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 125. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 
(1990). 
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to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.126 
In furtherance of the objective of eliminating discrimination against the 
disabled, Congress stated that “the Nation’s proper goals regarding 
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals[.]”127 
Title II of the ADA applies to state and local governments, mental health 
agencies, social service agencies, and the state courts and incorporates the 
anti-discrimination principles of Section 504.128  The anti-discrimination 
prohibitions of Title II, like those of Section 504, were written in several 
lines.129  In the ADA, Congress directed the Attorney General to promulgate 
regulations necessary to implement Title II,130 and mandated that those 
regulations “be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination 
regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations” under 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.131  Accordingly, the 
regulations that the Department of Justice promulgated under Title II are 
patterned after the Section 504 coordination regulations, including the 
integration mandate.132 
The position of the Department of Justice is that “integration is 
fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act.”133  The 
Department has adopted regulations, some similar or identical to the 
coordination regulations of Section 504.134  One such regulation, the 
integration mandate, is almost identical to the Section 504 integration 
regulation that has been in effect since 1981, which provides that “[a] 
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most 
 
 126. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990) 
(emphasis added). 
 127. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000) (emphasis 
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 129. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (2000). 
 132. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2007) (prohibiting disability discrimination by public entities 
and mandating that public entities administer services, programs, and activities in the most 
integrated setting appropriate); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
 133. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 332-33 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130, App. A (2007)). 
 134. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2007) (“No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the 
basis of disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any public 
entity.”). 
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integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities.”135 
In the seven years between the time that the ADA’s integration mandate 
took effect and the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C., a 
number of cases were brought seeking to enforce integration mandate 
provisions and to ensure that services were provided to disabled individuals 
in the community.136  In many of these cases, the facts of the case reveal 
that the plaintiffs were members of families.137  In some cases the court 
explicitly noted the desires of the plaintiffs and family members to be 
together;138 in others, the fact is provided as an aside, leaving the reader to 
imagine the sadness of the back story.139  In Helen L. v. Didario, for 
example, we learn that the sole remaining plaintiff, Idell S., had been 
 
 135. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2007); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1981); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) 
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see also Cercpac v. Health and Hospitals Corp., 147 F.3d 165, 166,168 (2d Cir. 1998) (suit 
alleging that a municipal agency failed to deliver medical care in the most integrated setting 
available); Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 1997) (suit brought by HIV-
positive Alabama inmates alleging that state prisons violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 by excluding HIV positive prisoners from programs offered); Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 
125 F.3d 1045, 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 1997) (suit brought by parents alleging that the state 
discriminated on the basis of their child’s disability by failing to adequately provide 
educational opportunities to her); Kathleen S. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 476, 
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League, Inc. 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (C.D.Cal. 1996) (finding that defendants’ failure to 
make necessary and reasonable attempts to ascertain what modifications, if any, were 
plausible in order to accommodate plaintiff’s disability was “discriminatory inaction against 
[p]laintiff on the basis of [p]laintiff’s disability”). 
 137. See Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1047 (parent brought action on behalf of child); Wyatt 
ex. rel. Rawlins, 985 F. Supp. at 1365 (stating that “[e]arlier in the year, the committee had 
reported to plaintiffs’ counsel and the court its concern that the majority of the children at the 
center were not in need of the type of restrictive and isolated environment the facility provides, 
and that these children could be more appropriately served in a less restrictive program closer 
to their homes and families.”); Cercpac, 147 F.3d at 166 (stating that the case was brought  
by “Lincoln CERCPAC, an association of individuals and families concerned with health care 
services for children with developmental disabilities, and four parents or guardians of minor 
children . . . .”); Shultz, 943 F. Supp. at 1222 (father brought claim on behalf of son to 
mandate integration). 
 138. See, e.g., Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (S.D.Ohio 1993). 
 139. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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physically disabled since 1973 from meningitis.140  She had a child around 
the time that she became disabled, and later had another child.141  When 
her two children were eight and sixteen, she was forced to enter a nursing 
home because of basic needs that could easily have been accommodated 
with attendant care services.142  She was placed on a waiting list to receive 
these services because Pennsylvania insufficiently funded home-based 
services.143  Idell S. lost six crucial years with her children while she was 
unnecessarily confined in a nursing home.144  The damage and injury done 
by Pennsylvania’s policies favoring nursing home placement over community 
services was not solely to Idell S., but to her children, who lost their mother 
for important years of their childhood and adolescence. 
D. Olmstead v. L.C. 
In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court heard the case of two women 
with mental retardation and psychiatric disabilities who were ready for 
discharge from an institution but continued to be confined because there 
were no appropriate community placements available for them.145  In 
Olmstead, the Supreme Court applied the ADA’s integration mandate and 
held that unjustified isolation was segregation that violated the ADA, 
regardless of whether a comparison class existed.146  In explaining why 
segregation of disabled people constituted discrimination, Justice Ginsberg 
noted that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life 
activities of individuals, including family relations,”147 and reinforced 
stigmatizing ideas that people with disabilities were incapable or unworthy of 
participating in community life.148  In a later case, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that barriers to marriage and having a family on the basis of 
disability were examples of the kind of discrimination that Title II was 
designed to address.149 
The Court in Olmstead held that the ADA did not require plaintiffs to 
show that a comparison class existed in order to prevail on claims under the 
integration mandate, but also noted that a comparison class did exist: non-
mentally disabled people who were not required to forego their liberty to 
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receive needed health services.150  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy argued that liberty is not the only due process right that mentally 
disabled people forego to receive needed health services, and recognized 
that non-disabled people need not forego association with their families to 
receive needed health services.151  Family association, no less than the 
liberty to live in the community, is destroyed by unnecessary 
institutionalization, isolation, and segregation.  In many ways, it is an 
equally important right because it helps give meaning and substance to life 
in the community.  In a moving account, Atlanta Legal Services reported on 
the success of the two plaintiffs in Olmstead v. L.C., Elaine Wilson and Lois 
Curtis, once they were able to live in the community.152  Strikingly, both their 
accounts of the joys of life in the community included interaction with family 
that had previously been denied to them: Lois Curtis “has (after many years) 
reconnected with her mom and sister,” and Elaine Wilson “made regular 
weekend trips home to be with her extended family.”153 
Two years prior to its decision in Olmstead, the Supreme Court held in 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. that 
[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are 
among [the] associational rights this Court has ranked as of ‘basic 
importance in our society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.  [A 
case] involving the State’s authority to sever permanently sever a parent-
child bond[] demands the close consideration the Court has long required 
when a family association so undeniably important is at stake.154 
Although a family does not have the right to state funds or new 
programs to keep it together,155 it does have the right, pursuant to the ADA 
and Olmstead, to require that services already offered by the State are not 
contingent on having to choose between family and association in the 
community and receipt of services in an isolated institutional setting.  While 
the Seventh Circuit held in Bruggeman v. Blagojevich that Medicaid does 
not create the right to services nearer to the recipient’s family, the court 
remanded the plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims.156 
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E. Cases about Family Integrity in the Wake of Olmstead v. L.C. 
Very few cases have attempted to apply the integration mandate in the 
context of family integrity.  Recently, a federal district court in Connecticut 
granted summary judgment to state agency defendants with respect to a 
parent’s Olmstead claim; the case challenged the disparity between 
Connecticut’s cap on both home-based services and family preservation 
services for seriously emotionally disturbed children and its unlimited 
provision of hospitalization for the same child.157  In addition, the plaintiff 
challenged the provision of inadequate services, and reduction of even 
those services, as making institutionalization inevitable and thus violating the 
integration mandate.158 
As to the second claim, the court held that the integration mandate did 
not support a claim for inadequate services, or create a right to stay out of 
institutions.159  It rejected the mother’s Olmstead claim regarding the 
disparity between the cap on funding for community-based family 
preservation services as opposed to hospitalization by noting that the child’s 
hospitalizations came at the request of the mother and/or the orders of a 
Probate Court.160  This analysis completely misses the point of the claim: it is 
as though the court in Homeward Bound, Helen L., or Olmstead had 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that they had voluntarily placed 
their children at the state institution, or stayed in institutional settings, when 
the state’s failure to fund community services gave them no choice. 
Several systemic challenges to the services received by children with 
emotional disabilities touch on family integration, but those claims have not 
been adjudicated on the merits.  In J.B. v. Valdez, plaintiffs challenged the 
defendant’s practice of failing to maintain family integrity by splitting siblings 
in foster care, but lost their motion for class certification.161  In Katie A. v. 
Bontá, the plaintiffs challenged the failure of Los Angeles County and the 
State of California to provide home-based and community-based mental 
health services to seriously emotionally disturbed children in the child 
welfare system.162  The plaintiffs sought the provision of wraparound home-
based services and therapeutic foster care services, which they argued 
would permit at least half of the children currently institutionalized in 
residential facilities to return home, or at least to therapeutic foster care 
homes in the community.163  Although the case included an Olmstead 
 
 157. M.K. ex rel. Mrs. K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 175, 197, 201 (D.Conn. 2008). 
 158. Id. at 195-96. 
 159. Id. at 198. 
 160. Id. at 199. 
 161. J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999 ). 
 162. Katie A. v. Bontá, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (C.D.Cal. 2006). 
 163. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] ACCOMMODATING FAMILIES 161 
claim, Los Angeles County settled with the plaintiffs, and the District Court 
granted a preliminary injunction against California on the Medicaid claims 
without reaching the ADA claims.164  The Ninth Circuit reversed on narrow 
grounds, accepting many of the district court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.165  The plaintiffs have renewed their request for a 
preliminary injunction, which is pending with the District Court.166 
The plaintiffs’ success in cases such as Katie A. and Rosie D. v. 
Romney167 in obtaining wraparound and home-based services have been 
based on the provisions of the EPSDT portion of the Medicaid statute, which 
applies only to children.168  Although the right is the child’s, one of the 
remedies—wraparound services—provides services for the family, enabling 
it to better accommodate the child.  Ironically, despite the Constitution’s 
embrace of family association and the ADA integration mandate, Medicaid 
EPSDT claims are presently the most successful vehicles to provide services 
to keep families together when one member has a disability. 
IV.  ADA LITIGATION IN TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS: A BLUEPRINT FOR FAILURE 
The principal ADA-based argument used to date to try to keep families 
together is that disabled parents must be accommodated in reunification 
services provided by social service agencies.169  Advocates have argued that 
in order for parents with disabilities to have effective access to these 
services, the ADA requires social service agencies and other public entities 
to modify the assistance and reunification services they provide to 
accommodate a parent’s disability.170  These cases have generally been 
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brought individually, as opposed to a class action suit, and they have 
generally been unsuccessful.171 
Although the social service agencies are undeniably covered by Title II of 
the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the resistance of state 
and federal courts to accommodation-based arguments in termination of 
parental rights proceedings is legendary.172  Courts have reasoned, for 
example, that termination proceedings are not “‘services, programs or 
activities’” covered by the ADA,173 that the ADA cannot be used as a 
defense to the termination of parental rights of a disabled parent,174 that the 
ADA does not apply to an individual termination proceeding because of the 
Younger abstention doctrine, and that even if the family services agency 
violates the parent’s ADA rights, it shouldn’t change the ultimate decision 
about terminating parental rights.175  Ultimately, the perspective in most of 
these cases distills down to the view that the federal ADA rights of the 
parents must be subordinated to the rights of the child, a view which 
explicitly frames the parent and child as adversaries.176 
This resistance seems explicitly rooted in courts’ hostility toward the 
psychiatrically disabled parent, which often appears to be a reflection of the 
social service agencies’ hostility to the disabled parent.  Several courts have 
faulted disabled mothers for exhibiting a “know-it-all” attitude and for being 
uncooperative or hostile with social workers who wanted to take their 
children away.177 
This hostility may be inevitable when parental termination proceedings 
inherently and structurally set up a framework that predisposes a court to 
regard the parental interests in keeping the child as fundamentally in conflict 
with the best interests of the child, who has usually already been removed 
from the home pursuant to a finding of abuse or neglect.  By bringing 
parental termination proceedings, a family services agency has made the 
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determination that the parent is irredeemably abusive or neglectful,178 and 
although the State technically has the burden of proof, a court may well be 
predisposed to credit an agency’s determination, especially in the case of a 
disabled parent.179  A disabled parent asking for accommodations is placed 
in the anomalous and paradoxical role of asserting that he or she can 
parent adequately, and simultaneously requesting what may well be 
perceived as “special” and “additional” services.  Reasonable 
accommodations have a troubled and inaccurate history of being equated 
in the minds of judges with affirmative action in race cases, and this may 
strike courts as a particularly inapposite right to assert when the welfare of a 
child is at stake.  Implicitly or explicitly, the accommodations to the parent 
are somehow seen as coming at the expense of the child.180 
In addition, litigating accommodation cases one at a time inevitably 
involves a focus on the parent’s difficulties and flaws as a parent.  Whatever 
aspect of the disability needs to be accommodated will inevitably be 
presented this way, rather than looking at the failure of the agency in 
planning to serve disabled parents and children when it has every reason to 
know that this group will constitute a large proportion, perhaps even a 
majority, of the people to whom it is mandated to provide services.  The 
specific problems of the parent before the judge is compared with the 
problems of an abstract alternative called “the foster care system.”  Very few 
courts, and almost all of them appellate or state supreme courts, are willing 
to relegate the child to an imperfect family rather than a foster care system 
whose flaws are usually not before the court.  In addition, few family service 
workers or judges are aware of the voluminous research literature reflecting 
the harm suffered by many children placed in foster care.181 
In any event, “accommodations” are the wrong way to characterize what 
is needed.  Accommodations presume a neutral service system that needs 
adjustment to be accessible to a person with a disability, rather than a 
systemic framework which is, in virtually every way, from state termination 
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statutes to the judicial proceedings themselves, built on a framework of 
discriminatory assumptions about the abilities of psychiatrically disabled 
women to parent, especially to parent children with special needs.  As I will 
argue in Section V, this framework has also been applied to parents with 
physical disabilities.  In that context, “accommodations” were not a viable 
solution because it was societal attitudes and perceptions of physical 
disability that needed to be changed. 
Ultimately, what is missing from these individual termination cases is a 
perception of the parent and child as part of one family, and an 
understanding that preserving this family is a good and valuable goal that is 
worth attempting to achieve for the benefit of all members of the family and 
for the community as a whole.  I have tried to show that this is because each 
individual case focuses necessarily on the parent rather than on the structure 
of the interlocking systems that predetermine adverse outcomes.  In the next 
section, I suggest that the ADA be used to confront those systems head-on.  
Instead of requesting accommodations, which assumes that the systemic 
framework and services are neutral and disabled people only need an 
adjustment or two for the system to work for them, advocates should expose 
systems as deeply and structurally discriminatory in ways that harm and 
undermine families with a disabled member, especially a disabled parent. 
Of course, not all parents with psychiatric disabilities can successfully 
parent, with or without accommodations, any more than all non-disabled 
individuals can successfully parent.  But individual exceptions have never 
justified a system that is structured in a discriminatory way, and the 
argument of this article is that if human services—mental health systems, 
child protective services systems, social services, and housing systems—
began with a goal and assumption of family preservation when any member 
of the family had a psychiatric disability, the system would look very 
different, and outcomes would be very different.  Psychiatric disability no 
more carries with it an automatic inability to parent than it does an 
automatic inability to live in the community. Over the course of an 
individual’s life, these prophecies of incapacity can become self-fulfilling, 
but they are not and never have been innate. 
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V.  THE ADA’S ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS, THE INTEGRATION MANDATE, 
AND FAMILY INTEGRITY 
A. The Integration Mandate and Family Preservation 
The court in Homeward Bound, a class action lawsuit, recognized the 
fundamental importance of keeping families together.182  In that case, 
parents wanted to keep their disabled children in a family environment, but, 
as the court recognized, they needed services and assistance to succeed.183  
Yet this framework has largely been lost in the twenty years following 
Homeward Bound, and neither the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA 
nor the integration mandate has been used as a tool to obtain services that 
families need to help them stay together. 
Being able to be part of a family is a distinct and crucial component of 
community integration.184  As the Supreme Court noted in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, 
[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares 
not only a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.  Among other things, therefore, 
they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree 
of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion 
from others in critical aspects of the relationship.185 
Families of origin are not the same as foster families,186 nor are they similar 
to group homes.187 
The Supreme Court held in Olmstead that a citizen should not have to 
trade his or her liberty to receive needed health services.188  It is equally 
 
 182. Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at 
*17-*18 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987). 
 183. Id. at *18. 
 184. See generally Bonnie R. Kraemer et al., Adolescents with Severe Disabilities: Family, 
School, and Community Integration, 22 J. ASS’N. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE HANDICAPS 224 
(1997). 
 185. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984). 
 186. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845-46 
(1977) (discussing “a foster family which has its source in state law and contractual 
arrangements.”). 
 187. Wimber v. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., No. 94-4042-SAC, 1994 WL 192039, at 
*11 n.8 (D. Kan. Apr. 13, 1994 ) (stating that “[t]he plaintiffs have not attempted to show that 
their decision to live in a group home is in the same nature as the deep, personal decisions 
and commitments associated with marriage, procreation, and raising children.”). 
 188. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999) (noting that “[i]n order 
to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those 
disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable 
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repugnant for parents and children to have to give up their rights to family 
association in order to receive needed mental health services, yet in the 
years since Joyner v. Dumpson thousands of parents had to give up custody 
of their children in order for those children to receive the mental health 
services that they need.189  As subsequent courts have held, the integration 
mandate protects people at risk of institutionalization, and the goal of the 
integration mandate is to help prevent unnecessary institutionalization and 
isolation as well as end it where it exists.190 
This article argues that keeping families together is, necessarily, a key 
component of the integration mandate.  Research shows that if families 
receive the services that they need, the chances that those children will be 
institutionalized or placed out of the home in segregated residential 
placements is greatly reduced.191  Although there is less research on the 
benefits of home-based services to the family when the disabled family 
member is the parent, both research and program results also tend to 
indicate that families are more likely to stay together when family support is 
provided in the community.192  Mothers with mental illness have identified 
being able to parent their children as a primary motivating factor for 
treatment,193 while also expressing hesitation to access available treatment 
because of fears that their children will be removed.194 
Psychiatrically disabled mothers describe termination proceedings, the 
risk of removal, court proceedings, and removal of their children as 
inordinately stressful, an indication of fundamental personal failure, and 
crisis of enormous proportions which often precipitates deterioration and 
 
accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services 
they need without similar sacrifice.”). 
 189. Weithorn, supra note 11, at 1375; see also Goodman, supra note 11; Simmons, 
supra note 11. 
 190. See Radaszewski ex rel. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 607-08 (7th Cir. 
2004); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 191. Editorial, Unkept Promises to the State’s Disabled, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 
10, 2002, at 2; Goodman, supra note 11, at 324-25. 
 192. See generally Joanne Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study of Programs for Parents 
with Serious Mental Illness and Their Children: Building Practice-Based Evidence, 34 J. BEHAV. 
HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 395 (2007) [hereinafter Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study]. 
 193. Carol T. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness: 
Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Postpartum Period, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 21, 21 (1995) 
[hereinafter Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Disabilities]; APFEL & 
HANDEL, supra note 14, at 4-5, 160-61. 
 194. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note 193, 
at 33; Dale Russakoff, A Failed Mother Returns to Her Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 20 1998, 
at A1. 
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hospitalization.195  In one parental termination case, the caseworker noted 
that 
‘[f]irst, it appears that much of the mother’s inappropriate and angry 
outbursts have been due to her being separated from the minor . . . [s]he 
has never been abusive to the minor . . . the mother copes very poorly 
under stress, and both the [c]ourt process as well as being separated from 
her child have put her under tremendous pressure and stress, and appear to 
have escalated her mental health problems.’196 
The caseworker, who had previously recommended reunification, 
recommended that the child not be returned home until “these issues 
subside.”197 
As the cases described above illustrate, the story of institutionalized 
people is so often the story of people separated from their families: grieving 
angry women who have lost their children, and insecure adolescents who 
bounced from one foster home to the other before winding up in residential 
care. 
In order to fully integrate individuals with psychiatric disabilities into 
every day community life, they must be seen, as is already the case with 
most physically disabled people, as capable of playing all potential roles in 
a family: not only children, but husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, 
grandparents, aunts and uncles—the essential components of the family 
unit, which is in turn, one of the essential building blocks of community.  
Until this is the case, people with psychiatric disabilities will be “isolated” 
even if they are deinstitutionalized; in the community but not part of it, 
hangers-on who peer into the warm windows of family life at the heart of 
community, but do not have a place at the table inside. 
B. The Fundamental Discriminatory Framework of the Human Services and 
Legal Systems With Regard to Parents with Psychiatric Disabilities 
The understanding of people with psychiatric disabilities as “almost 
genderless,”198 unsuitable to marry, unable to parent, and not even much 
use as siblings, is a legacy of the days of institutionalization and is a 
discriminatory stereotype which is embedded in state statutes, the practices 
of mental health agencies, the attitudes of social service professionals, the 
services provided by social services agencies, and in the court system. 
 
 195. See Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note 
193, at 33-34. 
 196. In re Kristin H. v. Kimberly I., 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1645-46 (1996). 
 197. Id. at 1646. 
 198. Mary Ann Test & Sharon B. Berlin, Issues of Special Concern to Chronically Mentally 
Ill Women, 12 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL. 136, 136 (1981). 
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The first step is transforming this situation for advocates is to step back 
and conduct a multi-system analysis of the structural impediments and 
barriers to keeping families together when one member has a psychiatric 
disability in their own state’s human service systems. 
1. State Statutes 
Far from requiring reasonable accommodations for psychiatric 
disabilities, a number of state parental termination statutes refer explicitly to 
diagnoses of mental illness or mental health conditions to expedite 
termination proceedings or limit the participation of parents with psychiatric 
disabilities.199  For example, in many states, the statutory requirement that 
reunification services be provided does not apply if the reason for 
termination is the parent’s mental illness.200  In some states the services 
need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that the parent is suffering from a mental disability as defined by statute 
“that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services”,201 a 
requirement that does not include the reasonable accommodation 
provisions of federal antidiscrimination law. 
As discussed previously, some states still have statutes requiring some 
form of parental relinquishment of rights in order for children to obtain 
needed mental health treatment.  While New York, where Joyner v. 
Dumpson was brought, has made substantial steps to provide family-based 
services, many other states lag far behind, and even states with statutes 
banning permanent relinquishment of custody in exchange for mental health 
services still permit a requirement of temporary relinquishment of custody to 
receive services.202 
2. Mental Health Agency Policies and Practices 
Mental health agencies erase the reality that many of their clients are 
parents, or even that they could have satisfying sexual, romantic, and 
parental relationships.  In fact, the vast majority of mental health agencies 
 
 199. ELIZABETH LIGHTFOOT ET AL., UNIV. OF MINN., GUIDE FOR CREATING LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGE: DISABILITY IN THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY 
STATUTES 2, available at http://cehd.umn.edu/SSW/cascw/attributes/PDF/Legislative 
Change.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (finding that thirty six states list mental illness as a 
ground for termination of parental rights); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-533(B)(3) (West 2008); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(p) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(a) 
(West 2008). 
 200. In re Custody and Guardianship of La’Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d 898, 908 (Fam. Ct. 
N.Y. County 2002). 
 201. In re A.O. v. Diane O., No. E039235, 2006 WL 872767, at *7 (Ct. App. Cal. Apr. 
5, 2006) (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b)(2) (2006)). 
 202. Goodman, supra note 11, at 328. 
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have no idea which of their clients are parents, and eighty percent of them 
have no policies on pregnant clients or clients who are parents.203  Most 
state psychiatric facilities do not permit children to visit their parents.204  A 
recent survey revealed that not one mental health agency had a visitation 
policy for hospitalized mothers and their children.205  Most group homes 
and community residential settings do not permit residents to marry or 
cohabit, and certainly not to live with children.206  Mental health agencies 
rarely include pregnancy and postpartum assistance as part of the services 
that they provide, let alone parenting assistance207 or help in planning for 
temporary placement of their children if the mother should have to be 
hospitalized.208  Mental health agencies often take the position that 
parenting assistance is a function of social service agencies,209 but social 
service agencies are generally only involved after a complaint has been 
made that parenting is inadequate.210  State mental health agencies vary 
widely in terms of the family-oriented services that they provide to clients 
with psychiatric disabilities.211 
3. Mental Health and Social Service Professionals’ Attitudes 
Mental health professionals are also notoriously judgmental about the 
abilities of people with psychiatric disabilities to parent: study after study, 
from Deborah Le Belle’s classic Lives in Stress, to more recent work, reflects 
that mothers with psychiatric disabilities are hesitant to seek mental health 
services because of their fear that their children will be removed.212  
 
 203. Biebel et al., supra note 32, at 31-32. 
 204. See Diana M. C. Cassell, Mother and Baby Admissions: Survey of Resources, 14 
PSYCHIATRIC BULL., 654, 654 (1990) (stating that thirty years ago, some hospitals had 
programs where mothers could be hospitalized with their children); Andrea K. Blanch et al., 
Parents with Severe Mental Illness and Their Children: The Need for Human Services 
Integration, in WOMEN’S MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 201, 201 
(Bruce Lubotsky Levin et al. eds., 1998). 
 205. Biebel et al., supra note 32, at 32. 
 206. APFEL & HANDEL, supra note 14, at 161. 
 207. Mowbray et al., Motherhood for Women with Serious Mental Illness, supra note 193, 
at 21; Daphna Oyserman et al., Resources and Supports for Mothers with Severe Mental 
Illness, 19 HEALTH &  SOC. WORK 132, 134 (1994). 
 208. See, e.g., Nicholson et al., A Qualitative Study, supra note 192, at 202; Joanne 
Nicholson & Andrea Blanch, Rehabilitation for Parenting Roles for People with Serious Mental 
Illness, 18 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. JOURNAL 109 (1994); J. Nicholson et al., “Sylvia Frumkin” 
Has a Baby: A Case Study for Policy Makers, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 497 (1996). 
 209. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 202; Nicholson et al., The Prevalence of 
Parenthood, supra note 20, at 130-31. 
 210. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 202. 
 211. Id. at 202-03. 
 212. Id. at 206; see also Deborah Belle et al., Mental Health Problems and Their 
Treatment, in LIVES IN STRESS: WOMEN AND DEPRESSION 197, 201 (Deborah Belle ed., 1982). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
170 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:135 
Hundreds of individual termination cases confirm that the person calling 
child protective services is often the parent’s mental health case worker or 
other mental health professional.213  Even when mental health workers do 
not act to remove the child from the parent’s custody, they often discourage 
parenting rather than take steps to assist the parent: 
One mother, Lindy Fox, who later became a researcher into the needs of 
parents with mental illnesses, describes how her early treatment providers 
viewed her children as major stressors.  Rather than offering her parenting 
education and family-centered treatment, her counselors encouraged her to 
believe that she could not cope with parenting.  Likewise, her husband was 
given no education about her disease, and her marriage fell apart.  Fox 
reports: 
I feel that I was pressured by my treatment providers to give up the care 
of my children . . . .  Early on, there should have been education about 
mental illness for me and my family.  Keeping the family unit intact 
should have been a primary goal . . . .  Instead of being convinced I 
couldn’t cope, I needed support and encouragement to care for them.  I 
needed someone to believe I could do it.  Regular day care for the 
children and someone coming into my home to help when the girls were 
small were possibilities that were not even considered . . . . Ongoing 
family treatment should be part of every treatment plan for mothers with 
a mental illness, with an emphasis on developing parenting skills, 
communication skills, problem-solving skills, and ability to manage 
stress.214 
The degree to which many professionals believe that individuals with 
psychiatric disabilities are committed to retaining their children is illustrated 
by the perspective one professional took in explaining one mother’s 
complete compliance with court orders and her determination to retain her 
parental rights: 
During the termination proceeding, Dr. Wunderman [a clinical psychologist] 
opined that the mother was ‘addicted’ to the termination proceeding, and 
that she had completed the required parenting course, visited her children at 
the scheduled times, and appeared in court ‘[a]s a means of escaping a 
feeling of tremendous emptiness, tremendous loneliness, tremendous 
nothingness that the borderline personality disorder does feel.’215 
 
 213. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 207. 
 214. Glennon, supra note 20, at 293-94. 
 215. Simms v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 641 So.2d 957, 962 n.2 (Fla.App.3d 
1994). 
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The mother in this case lost her parental rights despite completely complying 
with the agency’s plans and scheduled court appearances because her very 
compliance was framed as a symptom of her mental illness.216 
For twenty to thirty years, child protection workers and agencies had 
similar views of people with physical disabilities: fathers in wheelchairs 
couldn’t be fathers because they couldn’t play baseball with their children or 
provide for their needs.217  These perspectives were shared by the judges 
who heard the termination cases and adoption cases.  As Laura Rothstein 
pointed out, each disability came with its own presumptions,218 
presumptions so strong that even when a deaf mute couple had successfully 
parented their own children, a judge ordered that the application “of these 
poor unfortunate people” to adopt a child be refused because the child 
deserved a “normal” home.219  In a later case, parents who were HIV-
positive had to fight to keep their children.220  In 2009, most of these 
scenarios strike us as wrong-headed and almost absurd.  The agencies in 
those cases did not think in terms of what accommodations might be 
needed to assist physically disabled individuals to parent, because they 
didn’t think that physically disabled people should be parenting in the first 
place.  People with psychiatric disabilities continue to face a presumption of 
incapacity to parent in 2009, and requesting reasonable accommodations 
from agencies and judges who don’t think they should be parenting in the 
first place runs up against the same obstacles. 
4. Social Service and Family Service Agency Framework and Service 
Structure 
Family service and child protection agencies rarely have services tailored 
to the needs of people with psychiatric disabilities, even though such 
 
 216. Id. at 962. 
 217. In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 37, 40 (Cal. 1979) (reversing lower court 
decision removing custody of children from father in a wheelchair because he couldn’t play 
baseball with them or take them fishing). 
 218. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 185-87 (1984). 
 219. See Stein, supra note 28, at 1083-84; see also Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions 
of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1240 
(1990). 
 220. See, e.g., Carol Levine, AIDS and Changing Concepts of Family, 68 MILBANK Q. 
(Supplement 1) 33, 50-51 (1990) (discussing a father’s custody battle in which his HIV-
positive status was at issue); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 959, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1988); see Meriweather v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 255 S.W.3d 505, 506-08 (Ark. 
App. 2007) (finding that woman with mental retardation who “completed the lion’s share of 
the case plan” and who cared for her diabetic mother was not a fit parent; noting also that 
her arthritis made it difficult for her to hold the child). 
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individuals form a substantial proportion of the parents they see.221  Nor do 
these agencies have employees with expertise in psychiatric or 
developmental disability conditions, and usually a social worker does not 
have a clear understanding of basic mental health issues such as how 
psychiatric medications may affect an individual.222  This lack of education 
and understanding may also translate into stereotypical assumptions that an 
individual with a psychiatric disability cannot parent, although it is not clear 
that mental health professionals do not also share some of these 
stereotypes. 
Family service workers and judges are also largely unaware of social 
science research on the harm caused by taking children out of their families 
and placing them in foster care.  It is a harm so great that a matched study 
of “crack babies,” which compared newborns placed in foster care with 
newborns allowed to stay with their mothers, showed that “at six months of 
age, the infants left in foster care were significantly less likely to reach, roll 
over or sit up than those left with their mothers.”223 
5. State Court Prejudice and Stereotypes 
Education of state court judges should be one of the top priorities of 
advocates trying to keep families together when one member has a 
disability.  It is worth listing a number of false stereotypes reflected in lower 
court decisions and termination filings that also permeate the attitudes of 
child protective services workers and the agencies where they operate: 
* Psychiatric disability and symptoms are permanent and unchanging;224 
* Requiring assistance to parent means unfitness to parent; 
 
 221. See Duncan McLean et al., Are Services for Families with a Mentally Ill Parent 
Adequate?, in PARENTAL PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER: DISTRESSED PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 333, 
338-39 (Michael Göpfert et al. eds., 2d. ed. 2004) (discussing that eighty-eight percent of 
agency service providers report that services for parents with psychiatric disorders and their 
children are inadequate). 
 222. Id. at 339 (“Lack of knowledge and expertise was perceived as a significant barrier by  
slightly less than half (46%) of service providers.”). 
 223. Kathleen Wobie et al., To Have and To Hold: A Descriptive Study of Custody Status 
Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine, (paper presented at joint annual meeting of the 
American Pediatric Society and the Society for Pediatric Research, May 3, 1998). 
 224. See In re C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 102 (Mo. 2007) (reversing the decision of the lower 
court which had terminated parental rights based, inter alia, on the assumption that the 
mother’s bipolar disorder was permanent); see also Benedict v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 242 
S.W.3d 305, 317 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, No. CA 08-268, 2008 WL 2515678, at *1 
(Ark. App. Ct. June 25, 2008) (discussing a woman diagnosed with post partum psychosis 
who won appellate argument to regain custody of her children only to lose her children 
permanently after suffering one further episode of psychosis). 
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* Being disrespectful to the social worker means unfitness to parent; and 
* Attempting suicide means unfitness to parent. 
6. Outline of Remedies 
Although the problems discussed above are pervasive and fundamental, 
they have also been recognized for many years.  Thoughtful people have 
put together detailed solutions, which, not coincidentally, mirror the 
requirements of the ADA.225  In New York State over a decade ago, the 
Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Office of Mental Health (OMH) 
created a joint task force on parents with mental illness.226  The Task Force 
included professionals from both systems, consumers, researchers, 
advocates, providers, and members of local government.227  After compiling 
data and taking testimony at public hearings, the Task Force recommended, 
among other approaches, to: “[d]evelop ‘family services’ that do not divide 
adults from children”, “[i]ncrease capacity for in-home services”, “increase 
capacity for off-hour services (not just crisis)”, “[p]rovide flexible respite 
services”, “[e]ducate parents and children regarding mental illness”, 
“[t]arget public day care slots for children of mentally ill parents”, and 
“[i]ncrease staff competencies for both DSS and OMH staff”.228 
The Task Force recommended that the OMH include parenting 
programs and day care as part of its outpatient programs, that mental 
health outpatient providers “develop linkages with family support services”, 
that parental status and needs be added to mental health data forms and 
treatment plans, that visitation be established for hospitalized parents, and 
that its supported housing and residential programs include as a matter of 
course housing for parents with children.229  The Task Force also 
recommended that DSS revise its intake and eligibility policies “to ensure 
sensitivity to the needs and capacities of parents” with psychiatric 
disabilities.230  As the Task Force recognized, however, interagency 
coordination remained a serious and ongoing problem.231 
One interesting aspect of the recommendations made by the New York 
Task Force is how similar many of them are to the programs instituted by the 
 
 225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
 226. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 203. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 209 tbl.1. 
 229. Id. at 211. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Blanch et al., supra note 204, at 213. 
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court in Homeward Bound v. Hissom described previously in this article.232  It 
is not the case that we do not know, and have not known for over twenty 
years, what services are necessary to keep families together when one 
member has a disability.  Instead, we are unwilling to adjust our belief that 
these families shouldn’t be together, that splitting these families is ultimately 
a favor to the child who can be raised “normally” and the parent who is 
being asked to do more than his or her disability will permit.  To transform 
these multiple systems may seem daunting.  Yet no one disagrees that 
coordinating systems of care provides better and more efficient services, and 
services delivered to families are less expensive and have better outcomes 
than removing disabled family members from the home and paying for 
expensive and unnecessary residential care. 
Advocates can pursue one of several kinds of systemic cases.  First, a 
challenge to state policies requiring parents to relinquish custody of their 
mentally disabled children in order to receive necessary services for them, 
framed in terms of Section 504 and Olmstead, that only parents of children 
with psychiatric disabilities are required to surrender parental and 
associational rights in order for their children to receive services that the 
state already provides.233  Second, a systemic challenge in a state with a 
statute precluding parents with psychiatric disabilities from receiving 
reunification services provided to other parents, framed on behalf of families 
in which one or more members of the family is a client of a state mental 
health agency, where the family is at risk of dissolution and one or more 
family members is at risk of institutionalization because of the absence of 
family-based services that the mental health agency has reason to know that 
the family needs.  A case brought against multiple systems by a class of 
families is complex, to be sure, but it has at least a chance of creating 
change, unlike the individual appeals to the ADA in single parental 
termination proceedings.  As discussed previously, in a significant number of 
cases both parents and children will suffer from psychiatric or emotional 
disabilities, and in the absence of services received as a family, either or 
both parents and children are greatly at risk of institutionalization, 
segregation, and losing family ties that both children and parents cherish 
and need. 
 
 232. See Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem’l Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 
27104, at *33, *35, *36 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987); supra notes 103-115 and 
accompanying text. 
 233. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting H.R. REP. 485, 101st 
Cong., as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473, (emphasis added)). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The psychiatric disability of one family member profoundly affects all 
family members, and the best services and supports are those that are 
provided to the family as a whole.  Hence the title of my article: a family 
with one or more mentally disabled members is, by definition, an 
accommodating family, one that has made accommodations, however 
imperfect, to ensure the inclusion and participation of the parent, child, or 
sibling with a disability in the family.  A significant and surprising body of 
research shows that when families struggle to stay together, even when the 
mother has serious emotional or substance abuse problems, the children 
often fare significantly better than children who are removed from their 
homes.234  As the writings of families where one member has a disability 
reflect, families—parents and children alike—are often more successful at 
accommodating disabilities than might be imagined.  But it would help 
these families if society accommodated them, too.  As advocates, service 
providers, and policymakers, we need to start thinking more about 
accommodating families, about family integration as the first building block 
of community integration.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Olmstead, 
the fundamental damage of segregation is exclusion from the normal 
activities of community life.235  Families are at the very core of community 
life, and until the ADA is used successfully to protect families, its promise will 
be incomplete. 
 
 234. See Danson Jones et al., When Parents with Severe Mental Illness Lose Contact with 
Their Children: Are Psychiatric Symptoms or Substance Use to Blame?, 13 J. LOSS & TRAUMA 
261, 262 (2008) (discussing that children who are separated or removed from their parents 
often suffer from psychiatric illness such as depression, feelings of rejection, and anxiety). 
 235. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 583 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
176 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:135 
 
